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BRB No. 96-0360 
ALJ No. 94-LHCA-3277 
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(Opinion Filed: May 11, 1998) 
 
       David M. Linker, Esquire 
        (ARGUED) 
       Freedman and Lorry, P.C. 
 
       400 Market Street 
       Suite 900 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
        Attorney for Petitioner 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Honorable Gustave Diamond, Senior United States District Judge for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
 
  
       Francis M. Womack, III, 
        Esquire (ARGUED) 
       Weber Goldstein Greenburg 
        & Gallagher 
       One Evertrust Plaza 
       9th Floor 
       Jersey City, NJ 07032 
        Attorney for Respondents 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DIAMOND, District Judge. 
 
Claimant/petitioner, Josh Nelson, was injured in the 
course of his employment with respondent/appellee, 
American Dredging Company ("ADC"), and filed a claim for 
compensation under the Longshore and Harborworkers 
Compensation Act ("Act"), 33 U.S.C. S901 et seq. (1986). 
ADC contested the claim on the ground that Nelson's injury 
was not covered by the Act. After a hearing, the 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held that the Act did not 
cover Nelson's injury and denied compensation. The 
Benefits Review Board ("Board") affirmed the ALJ's decision, 
and Nelson appealed to this court pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 
S921(c). 
 
The decision of the ALJ affirmed by the Board included 
the denial of Nelson's motion to enforce a settlement 
agreement, the rejection of his contention that ADC had 
waived its right to challenge coverage under the Act, and a 
ruling that Nelson's injuries were not covered by the Act. 
We will affirm the Board's affirmance of the ALJ's refusal to 
enforce the alleged settlement agreement and his rejection 
of Nelson's contention that ADC had waived its right to 
challenge coverage under the Act; however, we will reverse 
and remand the Board's affirmance of the ruling that 
Nelson's injuries were not covered under the Act. 
 
Background Facts and Procedural History 
 
The operative facts in this matter are not in dispute. The 
American Dredging Company was a marine contractor 
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whose business operations included the renourishment/ 
reclamation of beaches to repair erosion and storm damage 
and to prevent such damage in the future. Josh Nelson was 
employed by ADC as an assistant foreman/bulldozer 
operator. 
 
On September 1, 1992, Nelson was injured as the result 
of a work-related accident. At the time of the accident, he 
was working on a beach reclamation project ("project") 
which ADC had been performing for about two months on 
Fenwick Island, Delaware, under a contract with the state 
of Delaware. The project consisted essentially of widening 
the beach by adding sand to it. The sand was obtained 
from the ocean floor approximately ten miles from the 
beach by a hopper dredge, a self-propelled vessel named 
Atlantic American. The sand was deposited in the hold of 
the vessel which then transported it to a mooring buoy 
located several hundred yards from the beach where ADC 
had constructed an underwater pipeline to the beach. The 
sand in a slurry form was unloaded from the vessel and 
deposited on the beach by pumping it through this pipeline.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. ADC's vice-president of finance described this operation as follows: 
 
       A. The hop... this picture here on page six is the hopper dredge 
       with pipeline attached to what we call a mooring buoy. The 
       mooring buoy is the vehicle by which the pipeline runs from the 
       buoy to the shore and along the shore. The dredge goes into the 
       ocean, to what we call the borrow area, which is an area that's 
       identified by the government that has the type and nature of 
       sand that they wish to put on the beach, and in effect, with drag 
       heads and suction pumps, suck[s] this sand off the ocean floor 
       and into the hopper. This hopper contains 4,000 cubic yards of 
       sand when it's filled. After it fills that, it then sails from the 
       borrow area to the buoy and attaches a flexible pipeline to the 
       barge ... 
 
       Q. Could you show the Judge? 
 
       A. [Referring to a photo in evidence] This is the buoy, and this is 
       the dredge, and this is the pipeline. It attaches this pipeline to 
       its pumps and then in effect pumps the sand out of the hopper 
       through the pipeline and along to the beach through an 
       underwater pipe. The reason this dredge is used in this 
       particular case is because the borrow area is farther away from 
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The flow of the sand through the pipeline and its 
distribution on the beach were controlled by moving the 
pipeline along the beach, by adding sections thereto, and 
by a system of valves on the pipeline. The final distribution 
and grading of the sand were done with a bulldozer. ADC 
was paid for this project on the basis of the number of 
cubic yards of sand added to the beach. 
 
Nelson operated the bulldozer, which he used not only to 
distribute and grade the sand on the beach but also to 
maneuver and otherwise work the pipeline as it unloaded 
the sand from the hopper dredge. It was his job to move the 
pipeline from place to place along the beach, add sections 
to it, and manipulate the valves to facilitate the unloading 
process. This required him to operate the bulldozer in the 
ocean waters and frequently to work knee deep in those 
waters on the pipeline. Nelson was supervised by a foreman 
on the beach who in turn was supervised by a foreman 
located on the dredge with whom communications were 
maintained by radio. The accident which gave rise to this 
suit occurred when Nelson, who was operating his 
bulldozer on the beach about fifty feet from the water's 
edge, slipped and fell as he was dismounting the machine 
in order to change a pipeline valve. 
 
At all times relevant to this case, the hopper dredge was 
in the navigable waters of the Atlantic Ocean off of Fenwick 
Island beach. The beach was used solely for recreational 
purposes; there were no docks, wharves, piers or other 
such structures on which vessels could berth on or near it. 
 
Following Nelson's injury, ADC filed a report of injury 
under the Act, acknowledging (1) that the injury o ccurred 
during the course of Nelson's employment and (2)  that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the shore than the pipeline length would allow. The long -- you 
       know, if it is ten miles away, you can't pump ten miles, so you 
       go with a hopper dredge out ten miles, and fill it with sand and 
       bring it in. This distance is probably several hundred yards. 
 
       Q. Indicating from the buoy to the shoreline. 
 
       A. To the shoreline. 
 
App. 98-99. 
 
                                4 
  
nature of ADC's business was "marine contractor." ADC 
voluntarily paid benefits under the Act from October 1992 
until June 1993 when a dispute arose as to the nature and 
extent of Nelson's disability, and, with the exception of a 
period between November 8 and December 14, 1993, 
compensation was terminated pending an impartial medical 
examination. 
 
After his benefits were terminated, Nelson filed a claim 
under the Act, and when the parties were unable to resolve 
their differences during an informal reconciliation process, 
a formal hearing before an ALJ was requested. 
 
At the hearing before an ALJ on January 13, 1995, 
Nelson's counsel appeared and informed the ALJ that the 
parties had reached "an agreement in principle," and that 
a stipulation pursuant to S8(i) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 
S908(i)(1), would be forthcoming once certain matters were 
resolved. He indicated that these matters included the 
specific amounts of outstanding welfare liens, medical bills 
which were paid and had to be reimbursed, and the 
allocation of attorney's fees. Nelson's counsel also explained 
to the ALJ that Nelson and counsel for ADC were not 
present at the hearing because the agreement in principle 
had been reached, but that the parties still were in the 
process of working out the details of the agreement and 
they needed 45 days to complete the stipulation and submit 
it for the ALJ's consideration. A non-lawyer representative 
of the respondent insurance carrier was present and 
concurred in the statements made by the Nelson's attorney. 
After a brief colloquy with Nelson's counsel wherein the 
general provisions of the contemplated settlement were 
summarized, the ALJ postponed further proceedings for 45 
days to provide the parties with time to submit aS8(i) 
application for settlement. 
 
Nelson's counsel subsequently forwarded a proposedS8(i) 
stipulation to counsel for ADC who then notified the ALJ 
that a settlement had not been reached, because, inter alia, 
there had been no agreement concerning ADC's 
responsibility for past and future medical expenses. Nelson 
filed a motion to enforce settlement and attached a copy of 
the unexecuted S8(i) stipulation, but the ALJ entered an 
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order denying the motion and scheduling a formal hearing 
for April 27, 1995. 
 
Following the April 27 hearing, ADC moved for judgment 
on the ground that Nelson had failed to satisfy the 
requirements for coverage under the Act. Nelson responded 
that he had met the coverage requirements and further that 
ADC had waived the issue of coverage by paying benefits 
under the Act and failing to raise this issue at the informal 
level before the District Director. 
 
On November 9, 1995, the ALJ rendered a decision 
denying Nelson's claim for benefits on the sole ground that 
he had failed to satisfy the requirements for coverage under 
the Act. 
 
Nelson appealed to the Board, which affirmed the ALJ as 
indicated supra. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. S921(c). The standard of review is "limited to a 
determination of whether the Board acted in conformance 
with applicable law and within its proper scope of review." 
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Rock, 953 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 
1992) (quoting Curtis v. Schlumberger Offshore Service, Inc., 
849 F.2d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 1988)). "When factual findings 
are at issue, we ... make an independent factual review to 
determine whether the Administrative Law Judge's findings 
were supported by substantial evidence ...." Id. (citing 
Janusziewicz v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 677 F.2d 
286, 290 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 
Discussion 
 
The Settlement Agreement and Waiver Issues 
 
Nelson's contention that the Board erred in affirming the 
ALJ's refusal to enforce the alleged settlement agreement 
and his rejection of Nelson's contention that ADC waived its 
right to challenge coverage are without merit. 
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In ruling on the ALJ's refusal to enforce settlement, in 
addition to finding several fatal procedural defects in 
Nelson's petition for review before the Board, the Board 
found that the ALJ committed no error since the record was 
devoid of evidence of a completed settlement agreement 
between the parties and further because no settlement 
application had been submitted to the ALJ in accordance 
with the regulations found in 20 C.F.R. SS702.241-702.243. 
Nelson v. American Dredging Company and Signal Mutual 
Insurance Company, 30 BRBS 205, 208 (1996). 
 
20 C.F.R. S702.243(a) provides in its pertinent part: 
 
       (a) When the parties to a claim for compensation ... 
       agree to a settlement they shall submit a complete 
       application to the adjudicator ["district director or 
       administrative law judge (ALJ)" S702.241]. The 
       application shall include all of the information outlined 
       in S702.242 .... 
 
Section 702.242(a) and (b) of the regulations provide in 
their pertinent parts: 
 
       (a) The settlement application shall be a self-sufficient 
       document which can be evaluated without further 
       reference to the administrative file. The application 
       shall be in the form of a stipulation signed by all 
       parties .... 
 
       (b) The settlement application shall contain the 
       following: 
 
       (1) A full description of the terms of the settlem ent 
       which clearly indicates, where appropriate, the 
       amounts to be paid for compensation, medical 
       benefits, survivor benefits and representative's fees 
       which shall be itemized as required by S702.132. 
 
20 C.F.R. S702.242(a), (b)(1). 
 
No such application ever was filed with the ALJ. Nelson 
argues, nevertheless, that the record demonstrates that an 
enforceable agreement had been reached by the parties, 
and, referring to rulings of this court which recognize a 
federal district court's equitable jurisdiction to enforce 
settlement agreements based upon oral representations 
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made by the litigants before it, urges this court to adopt a 
similar rule under the Act. See generally Green v. John H. 
Lewis & Co., 436 F.2d 389, 390 (3d Cir. 1970); Good v. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 384 F.2d 989, 990 (3d Cir. 
1967). 
 
The Board was correct in affirming the ALJ. The 
applicable regulations cited by the Board in its ruling 
prescribe in detail the procedures for, and the necessary 
contents of, settlement applications under the Act. The 
parties never complied with these regulations. In view of the 
detailed requirements and formal procedures specified in 
the regulations promulgated under the Act for effectuating 
a settlement, a serious question arises as to whether under 
any circumstances an adjudicator or a court properly may 
enforce a settlement agreement which does not comply with 
those regulations. We need not resolve that question at this 
time, however, because the parties never reached a 
settlement agreement. There was at most an "agreement in 
principle" to settle, which never matured. 
 
Nelson's counsel at the January 13, 1995, hearing stated 
only that the parties had "reached an agreement in 
principle to resolve this case." He advised the ALJ that 
there were details to be worked out and requested 45 days 
within which to accomplish this and to provide the ALJ 
with an appropriate S8(i) stipulation of settlement. The 
areas upon which final agreement had not been reached 
were quite material and included the amount of 
outstanding liens in addition to such items specifically 
required by 20 C.F.R. S702.242(b)(1), supra, as the 
apportionment of medical expenses and the amount of the 
attorney's fees which Nelson would be required to bear. 
 
When asked by the ALJ to elaborate on his assertion that 
the parties had reached an "agreement in principle," 
counsel for Nelson stated: 
 
       No. We reached an agreement as to the amount of the 
       money that's going to be in the 8(i). When I say 
       "principle," the only issue we haven't discussed which 
       is complete discussion (sic) is attorney fee thing as to 
       how we're going to handle that. But we have a 
       consensus on that. But Mr. Womack [counsel for ADC] 
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       doesn't have the authority yet on that from Signal 
       [ADC's insurance carrier and a co-respondent in this 
       case]. 
 
       The person who he's dealing with is not in town. 
 
       I've spoken to my client generally about the format of 
       the agreement, and I told him I can't (sic) him a sum 
       certain because I don't have the printout from welfare. 
       And they've told me to get a current medical printout. 
 
       It will take about two weeks. But he's agreeable to the 
       format that we have worked out, and the Claimant will 
       not bring any other claims under any other acts. 
 
App. 14-15 (emphasis supplied). 
 
These were material matters under the Act. As a result of 
their omission, it is obvious that the parties had not arrived 
at a settlement agreement by January 13, 1995, but, 
indeed, only at "an agreement in principle" to settle. This 
never was consummated, and as a consequence there was 
no settlement agreement, formal or informal, for the ALJ to 
enforce. 
 
Little need be said on the waiver issue. Nelson was well 
aware at least as early as the January 13, 1995, hearing, 
a full three months prior to the final hearing on April 27, 
1995, that ADC was raising coverage questions. In fact, 
counsel for Nelson cited the "jurisdictional" issue as one of 
his reasons for recommending to his client that the case be 
settled on an S8(i) basis. At the hearing counsel for Nelson 
stated: 
 
       There are serious questions in this case of jurisdiction 
       and extent of disability. And -- 
 
       Judge Romano: Jurisdiction under the Longshore Act 
       you mean? 
 
       Mr. Linker: Yes. It was not raised by the employer at 
       the informal level, but it is being raised now. It's a 
       serious -- in my view, it's a serious question in this 
       case. And under the circumstances, we have 
       recommended to the Claimant and Claimant's -- 
       referred counsel to us that the matter be resolved on 
       an 8(i) basis. 
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App. 15. 
 
In affirming the ALJ, the Board found that the coverage 
issue had been timely raised and properly considered by 
the ALJ. See 30 BRBS at 206. We agree. See 20 C.F.R. 
S702.336(a) and S702.317, cited by the Board in support of 
its rulings. 
 
I. The Coverage Issue 
 
We proceed now to address the principal issue in this 
case; i.e., whether Nelson's injuries are covered by the Act. 
 
The Applicable Law 
 
Prior to 1972, coverage existed under the Act only for 
injuries sustained upon the "navigable waters of the United 
States (including any ... dry dock ...)." 33 U.S.C. S903 (1970 
ed.). In 1972, Congress amended the Act and imposed a 
two-part test which looks to "both the `situs' of the injury 
and the `status' of the injured" to determine eligibility for 
compensation. Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. 
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 265 (1977). 
 
The situs requirement was expanded by an amendment 
to provide: 
 
       ... Compensation shall be payable under this Act in 
       respect of disability or death of an employee, but only 
       if a disability or death results from an injury occurring 
       upon navigable waters of the United States (including 
       any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building 
       way, marine railway, or other adjoining area 
       customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, 
       repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel). 
 
33 U.S.C. S903(a). 
 
In conjunction with the expanded definition of situs, 
Congress enacted a so-called "status" requirement and thus 
restricted coverage for disability under the Act to 
employees, defined as persons engaged in "maritime 
employment." Caputo, 432 U.S. at 264. The pertinent 
amendment provides: 
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       The term "employee" means any person engaged in 
       maritime employment, including any longshoreman or 
       other person engaged in longshoring operations and 
       any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, 
       shipbuilder and shipbreaker .... 
 
33 U.S.C. S902(3). Finally, the term "employer" was defined: 
 
       The term "employer" means an employer any of 
       whose employees are employed in maritime 
       employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable 
       waters of the United States (including any adjoining 
       pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine 
       railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an 
       employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a 
       vessel). 
 
33 U.S.C. S902(4). 
 
The 1972 amendments thus broadened the scope of the 
geographic requirement under the Act and at the same time 
imposed an occupational requirement, each of which has a 
distinct and consistent meaning. P.C. Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. 
Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 78 (1979). This court has noted that 
although Congress did partially identify the scope of 
maritime employment as "including a longshoreman or 
other person engaged in such operations and any harbor- 
worker such as a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship- 
breaker, the scope of `maritime employment' [remains] ... 
imprecise." Sea-Land Service, 953 F.2d at 60 (citing 33 
U.S.C. S902(3)). 
 
While the statutory definition is somewhat imprecise, the 
Court has held that the scope of maritime employment 
clearly includes those employees "on the situs involved in 
the essential or integral elements of the loading or 
unloading process." Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. 
Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40, 46 (1989). The Supreme Court 
repeatedly has emphasized that the broad language 
employed in the 1972 amendments indicates that an 
expansive view of the legislation is appropriate. In Caputo, 
the Court observed: 
 
       The language of the 1972 amendments is broad and 
       suggests that we should take an expansive view of the 
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       extended coverage. Indeed, such a construction is 
       appropriate for this remedial legislation. The Act"must 
       be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose, 
       and in a way which avoids harsh and incongruous 
       results." Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333, 98 L.Ed. 5, 
       74 S.Ct. 88 (1953). 
 
Id., 432 U.S. at 268. See also Director, Office of Workers' 
Compensation Programs, U.S. Dept. of Labor v. Perini North 
River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1983). 
 
II. The Situs Test 
 
The ALJ ruled that Nelson did not satisfy the situs test. 
He first found that Nelson was not actually on navigable 
water at the time of his injury and then proceeded to find 
that the actual situs of the injury, the beach at Fenwick 
Island, neither adjoined navigable waters nor was used in 
any way to facilitate or further maritime commerce or 
transportation. In arriving at this conclusion, he applied 
the factors which the court in Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. 
v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978), held should 
be considered in determining if the site of an injury, which 
did not occur on navigable water as such, qualified as an 
"adjoining area" under the Act. He also deemed it 
significant that there were no piers, bulkheads, or other 
facilities on the beach where vessels could berth or where 
loading, unloading or any other activity incidental to 
commerce or shipbuilding could have occurred and thus 
concluded that the beach was only a "natural" or 
"recreational area." 
 
All of this led the ALJ to rule that the site "was not, and 
could not be, used for any maritime purpose" and that 
therefore it failed the "situs test under S3(a) of the Act." 
 
In affirming the ALJ, the Board stated: 
 
       We affirm the Administrative Law Judge's finding that 
       claimant was not injured on a covered situs. Initially, 
       we note that the site is "adjoining" and "contiguous" to 
       navigable water; it cannot seriously be contended that 
       the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Delaware is not 
       navigable water or that it is not used for maritime 
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       commerce. That an injury occurs in an area adjacent 
       to navigable waters does not end the situs inquiry, as 
       the area must be "customarily used by an employee 
       [sic] for loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or 
       building a vessel." In this case, the record is devoid of 
       evidence supporting a finding that the site of claimant's 
       injury was used for traditional maritime purposes. 
       Rather, it is uncontroverted that the site of claimant's 
       injury is an unimproved beach fronting the ocean. 2 We, 
       therefore, affirm the ALJ's finding that claimant was 
       not injured on a covered situs. 
 
Nelson, 30 BRBS at 207. [The text of footnote 2 appears 
below]. Although the Board rejected the ALJ's finding that 
the Atlantic Ocean at Fenwick Island was not a navigable 
water way and that it was not used for maritime commerce, 
it nevertheless found that the area did not qualify as a S3(a) 
situs. It reasoned that not only must the area be adjacent 
to navigable waters but it also must be "customarily used 
by an employee [sic] for loading, unloading, repairing, 
dismantling or building a vessel." It then concluded that 
"[i]n this case, the record is devoid of evidence supporting 
a finding that the site of claimant's injury was used for 
traditional maritime purposes. Rather, it is uncontroverted 
that the site of claimant's injury is an unimproved beach 
fronting the ocean." Id. The Board further reasoned: 
 
       2. Claimant argues that his work involved unloading 
       sand from a dredge, see status discussion, infra, and 
       that the beach thus falls within S3(a) due to the 
       "discharge" of sand from the vessel. Claimant's Brief at 
       13. We do not agree that the discharge of sand onto 
       the beach makes it an area "customarily" used for 
       unloading a vessel, since the customary use of the 
       beach is recreation. See also Sidwell v. Express 
       Containers Services, Inc., 74 F.3d 1134, 29 BRBS 138 
       (CRT) (4th Cir. 1995) (an adjoining area must be a 
       "discreet structure or facility, the very raison d'etre of 
       which is its use in connection with navigable waters"). 
       (emphasis added). 
 
Id. at n.2. 
 
We disagree with the Board's rationale and its reading of 
that portion of S3(a) of the Act. The Board construed the 
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language to mean that the customary use of the beach had 
to be for some maritime purpose. But the word 
"customarily" in S3(a) modifies the phrase "adjoining area ... 
used by an employer," not simply the phrase "adjoining 
area." The Board's construction would eliminate the phrase 
"used by an employer" from the amendment so that it 
would read "or other adjoining area customarily used in 
loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling or building a 
vessel." Of course, if that were the language employed by 
Congress, the Board's conclusion that in order for a site to 
be an "other adjoining area" covered by the Act, such area 
must customarily be used, in effect, by the maritime 
industry for some maritime purpose would be more tenable. 
But the dispositive question in S3(a) is not whether the 
beach "customarily is used" for "loading, unloading ..." but 
rather whether "an employer customarily" uses the beach 
for loading, unloading ...." 
 
ADC is a maritime employer within the meaning of the 
Act. It is in the business of dredging channels and 
reclaiming beaches. A fair reading of the uncontradicted 
testimony of Nelson and of ADC's chief financial officer at 
the April 27, 1995, hearing, the only witnesses who 
testified, supports the following: ADC performed a number 
of these beach reclamation projects, and thus was in the 
beach reclamation business. The Fenwick Island project 
was typical in that the sand used to rebuild the beach had 
to be obtained from a "borrow" area from thefloor of the 
ocean at a point which was beyond the reach of the pipeline 
which ADC used to pump this sand onto the beach being 
reclaimed. Therefore, ADC employed a hopper dredge to 
dredge the sand from the borrow area and to load it into 
the hopper of the dredge vessel which then transported the 
sand to the pipeline. The sand then was pumped from the 
hopper dredge through the pipeline and unloaded onto the 
beach. The Fenwick Island beach was an area contiguous 
to navigable waters. And it and similar beaches customarily 
were used by ADC, an employer, to unload its hopper 
dredge vessel. In fact, this had been done on this job for 
approximately two months prior to the time when Nelson 
was injured. 
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Based on the foregoing, we believe that the beach at 
Fenwick Island qualified as an adjoining area customarily 
used by at least one maritime employer to unload its vessel. 
 
The Board, however, cites Sidwell v. Express Containers 
Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 2570 (1996), for the proposition that 
in order for an adjoining area to qualify as a situs it "... 
must be a `discrete structure or facility', ...." It is true that 
the court in Sidwell, applying the canon of statutory 
construction noscitur a sociis, concluded that the "other 
adjoining area" referred to in S3(a) must be like the so- 
called areas which are listed in that section; i.e.,"... any 
adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, 
marine railway ...," each of which, with the possible 
exception of the building way, the court found to be a 
"discrete structure or facility." Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1139. 
 
We respectfully decline to adopt this construction of the 
statute. The structures identified in S3(a) which preceded 
the phrase "other adjoining area" were not referred to in 
that section as "areas." The Sidwell court opined that by 
using the term "other adjoining area" the drafters of the 
amendment thereby were referring back to the enumerated 
structures; i.e., pier, wharf, dry dock, as areas. But giving 
the word "area" its plain meaning as we are required to do 
in construing the statute,3 wefind that it does not denote 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Supreme Court recently referred to this rule of statutory 
construction in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. ___, 
136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997): 
 
       Our first step in interpreting a statute is to determine whether 
the 
       language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with 
       regard to the particular dispute in the case. Our inquiry must 
cease 
       if the statutory language is unambiguous and "the statutory scheme 
       is coherent and consistent." United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, 
       Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 103 L.Ed.2d 290, 109 S.Ct. 1026 (1989); 
       see also Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254, 
       117 L.Ed.2d 391, 112 S.Ct. 1146 (1992). 
 
       The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 
       reference to the language itself, the specific context in which 
that 
       language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a 
whole. 
       Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 477, 120 
       L.Ed.2d 379, 112 S.Ct. 2589 (1992); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 
       136, 139, 114 L.Ed.2d 194, 111 S.Ct. 1737 (1991). 
 Robinson, 519 U.S. ___, 136 L.Ed.2d at 813. 
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a building or structure as such, but rather an open space, 
indeed sometimes within a building or other structure. 
 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993) at p. 
115 defines "area" as: 
 
       a piece of level ground, a level or relatively level piece 
       of unoccupied or unused ground; ... a clear or open 
       space of land; ... a definitely bounded piece of ground 
       set aside for a specific use or purpose; ... the enclosed 
       space or site on which a building stands; ... a clear or 
       open space within a building; .. a definitely bounded 
       part or section of a building set aside for a specific use 
       or purpose; ... any particular extent of space or 
       surface. (emphasis supplied). 
 
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
(1976) at p. 69 similarly defines "area" as: 
 
       1. A flat, open, or unoccupied piece of ground. 2. A part 
       of the earth's surface; region. 3. A distinct part or 
       section, as of a building, set aside for a specific 
       function .... 4. The range or scope of anything: the 
       whole area of finance. 5. The yard of a building; an 
       areaway .... 
 
There is nothing in the definition of the word "area," 
therefore, which suggests that by its use in S3(a) the 
drafters intended that it refer back to and be modified by 
any of the preceding enumerated sites which happen to be 
structures. Contrary to the Board's holding, an unimproved 
beach falls within the plain meaning of the word "area" as 
defined above. 
 
In addition, we find it to be inconsistent with the 
remedial purpose of the 1972 amendments of the Act and 
the liberal construction they are to be given to conclude 
that Congress intended by this indirect means to provide 
coverage under the Act only for injuries which occur on 
certain definable structures. Instead, it is more consistent 
with that purpose and "the broader context of the statute 
as a whole," Robinson, 519 U.S. at ___, 136 L.Ed.2d at 813, 
to conclude that Congress intended primarily by this 
language to ensure that the area where an injury occurs be 
on or adjacent to navigable waters. 
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Accordingly, we hold that under the facts and 
circumstances of this case the beach at Fenwick Island 
constituted an adjoining area where ADC customarily 
unloaded (sand from) its vessels. As such it constituted a 
covered maritime situs under the Act. 
 
III. The Status Requirement 
 
The ALJ also found that Nelson did not satisfy the status 
requirement. In the words of the ALJ, Nelson 
 
       was employed as a bulldozer operator on a beach 
       renourishment project. The purpose of the project was 
       to put sand on the beach area. It had nothing 
       whatsoever to do with maritime commerce or the 
       construction or repair of vessels. Nelson's work was not 
       maritime in nature. His job was to move material (sand 
       and pipes) with a bulldozer. It was not related to 
       maritime commerce. 
 
App. 156. 
 
In affirming the ALJ, the Board rejected Nelson's 
argument that a considerable and important aspect of his 
job activity had to do with unloading sand from the dredge 
vessel, Atlantic American. It held: 
 
       Despite claimant's attempts to characterize his 
       bulldozing activity as integral to the unloading process, 
       we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the 
       bulldozing activities performed by claimant for 
       employer in this case involved the movement of sand as 
       part of the process of rebuilding the beach, rather than 
       maritime commerce. Inasmuch as claimant's bulldozing 
       duties were integral to employer's beach renourishment 
       project rather than longshoring activities, we affirm the 
       Administrative Law Judge's determination that these 
       duties are insufficient to confer coverage under the Act. 
       See Caputo, 432 U.S. at 249, 6 BRBS at 150; Schwalb, 
       493 U.S. at 40, 23 BRBS at 96 (CRT); Garmon v. 
       Aluminum Company of America-Mobil Works, 28 BRBS 
       46, 49 (1994). (emphasis added). 
 
We do not subscribe to this reasoning. It is undisputed 
that the hopper dredge on the Fenwick Island project 
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obtained sand from the ocean floor approximately 10 miles 
from Fenwick Island beach. Approximately 4,000 cubic 
yards of sand at a time were loaded into the hold of the 
vessel. At this point that sand literally became the "load" 
being carried by that vessel. When this self-propelled vessel 
then transported its load a distance of 9 miles on the 
Atlantic Ocean to the pipeline buoy, that ship was in 
maritime commerce, and we would add, as much so as it 
would have been had it transported its load of sand from 
Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. When that load was 
transferred from the hopper dredge onto the Fenwick Island 
beach by pumping it through the pipeline, it literally was 
"unloaded" as much as it would have been had it been 
bagged and removed from the vessel by a crane and cargo 
nets. 
 
From the undisputed facts it is clear that Nelson was a 
vital part of the unloading process. With the aid of his 
bulldozer he moved the pipeline up and down the beach in 
order strategically to deposit; i.e., to unload, the sand; he 
waded knee deep into the ocean waters to adjust valves and 
add sections to the pipeline; and finally he moved the sand 
from where it was pumped in those waters adjacent to the 
beach to the shore and then graded the sand on the beach 
with his bulldozer. Even if we assume arguendo that this 
final grading was not an integral part of the unloading 
process, but, instead was part of the process of rebuilding 
the beach, it is abundantly clear that in all other respects 
Nelson was directly and intimately involved in unloading 
the hopper vessel. This was more than enough to constitute 
maritime employment.4 
 
The fact that all of this was done in connection with, and 
for the ultimate purpose of, the renourishing of a beach is 
wholly irrelevant to a determination of the nature of the 
work which was being done by Nelson. There is no basis in 
the case law or logical reasoning to support the proposition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. It is sufficient that Nelson "spen[t] `at least some of [his] time in 
indisputably longshoring operations.' " Pfeiffer, 444 U.S. at 75. Maritime 
employment clearly includes employees "involved in the essential or 
integral elements of the loading or unloading process." Schwalb, 493 
U.S. 46 (1989). 
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that what otherwise would constitute the act of unloading 
a vessel becomes a non-unloading, and thus a non-covered, 
act because of the ultimate use to which the product being 
unloaded is put. Neither Caputo nor Schwalb nor Garmon 
cited by the Board in support of this concept, does so. 
 
In Garmon, the claimant's employer manufactured 
aluminum. The employer had a building where it stored 
bauxite and from which it drew this aluminum ore as it 
was needed in the manufacturing process. The bauxite was 
transported by ship to state-owned docks where state 
employees unloaded it and ultimately delivered it to the 
floor of the storage building, where it was stored by 
claimant's employer for up to three months until it was 
needed in the manufacturing process. Claimant was a 
bulldozer operator employed by the aluminum 
manufacturer. His job was to bulldoze into piles the bauxite 
previously deposited on the floor of his employer's storage 
building by state employees where it was held until 
ultimately it was transferred within the employer's 
manufacturing facility for use in the manufacturing 
process. Under those facts, an ALJ held that the claimant 
was not engaged in the unloading process because his 
"operating duties were not necessitated by unloading 
operations but by employer's use of bauxite in the process 
of manufacturing aluminum." On appeal the Benefits 
Review Board affirmed, concluding "... claimant's bulldozing 
duties were integral to employer's manufacturing process 
rather than to longshoring activities ...." 
 
The critical factual differences between Garmon's and 
Nelson's activities are too obvious to require analysis 
beyond noting that Garmon's duties commenced after the 
state employees had completed the unloading of the bauxite 
and had delivered it to Garmon's employer. Nelson, on the 
other hand, was at the exit end of a pipeline 
contemporaneously performing functions essential to the 
unloading of sand from a vessel by this pipeline. 
 
It is significant, moreover, that the Board in Garmon 
remanded the case for the ALJ to address the contention 
that claimant's duties in cleaning the employer's conveyor 
belts and retrieving bauxite from the floor and returning it 
to those belts were part of the unloading process, stating 
 
                                19 
  
that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the status test 
focuses on claimant's overall duties; thus, an employee is 
covered under the Act if he spends `at least some' of his 
time in loading and unloading. Caputo, 432 U.S. at 273, 6 
BRBS at 165. See also Ford, 444 U.S. at 337, 11 BRBS at 
328." Garmon, 28 BRBS at 49. 
 
Garmon thus strongly supports Nelson's position and 
illustrates precisely the point that all of a claimant's work 
activities must be considered in determining whether he 
was engaged in maritime employment. 
 
In Schwalb, the claimants were employees of a railroad 
working at a terminal where coal was being loaded from 
railway cars onto ships. The claimants were injured either 
while cleaning or while repairing equipment that was used 
in the loading process. The Supreme Court reversed the 
Supreme Court of Virginia which had held that claimants 
were not engaged in maritime employment when they were 
injured. The Court stated at 493 U.S. 47: 
 
       Although we have not previously so held, we are quite 
       sure that employees who are injured while maintaining 
       or repairing equipment essential to the loading or 
       unloading process are covered by the Act. Such 
       employees are engaged in activity that is an integral 
       part of and essential to those overall processes. That is 
       all that S902(3) requires. Coverage is not limited to 
       employees who are denominated "longshoremen" or 
       who physically handle the cargo. ... 
 
Schwalb thus also supports Nelson's position, because he 
was even more directly involved in the loading/unloading 
process than were the claimants in Schwalb. 
 
Caputo, supra, also cited by the Board in support of its 
holding that at the time of his injury Nelson was not 
engaged in maritime employment, provides scant authority 
for that ruling. In Caputo the court upheld coverage for a 
terminal laborer who was injured while rolling a dolly 
loaded with cheese onto a consignee's truck, the cheese 
previously having been unloaded from a vessel on navigable 
waters. The Court also upheld coverage for another 
claimant who was injured as he was marking the cargo 
removed from a container which had been unloaded from a 
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vessel. In each instance, the claimant's activities were 
much more indirect and further removed from the 
unloading process than were Nelson's. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that under the facts 
and circumstances of this case that at the time Nelson was 
injured he was engaged in maritime employment on a 
covered situs within the meaning of the Act. The Board's 
rulings to the contrary were not in conformance with the 
applicable law; accordingly, we will reverse the Board's 
ruling with regard to the coverage question and remand it 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other 
respects, the Board's rulings will be affirmed. 
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